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1Summary
In late December 2000 the Ministry of Justice and Security of the Argentine province of Mendoza
completed the first phase of the programme Canje de Armas por Mejores Condiciones de Vida,
hereafter referred to as the Arms Exchange Programme, as part of a multi-faceted long-term
approach to transform the public security climate. Two hundred eighty five pistols, revolvers and
shotguns were voluntarily turned in by citizens for destruction in exchange for vouchers for foodstuffs
and tickets to football games with values ranging from US $50 to $100. Participants were able to
make contact with the programme organisers through a toll-free telephone line. Prior to the firearm
turn-in component a public education effort was coordinated in the school system that culminated in a
violent toy turn-in and destruction drive that brought in thousands of toy guns and video games for
public destruction and incorporation into displays of art.
The overwhelmingly positive response to the first phase of the programme inspired organisers to
launch a second phase of weapons collection on 10 April 2001 including sectors of the province
outside the Greater Mendoza area. Although the second phase was scheduled to end on 24 April 2001
it had to be extended on two separate occasions in response to enthusiastic requests from several
localities that were not originally scheduled to host the Arms Exchange Programme. The second
phase, which lasted six weeks, collected a total of 2,281 weapons and 6,547 rounds of ammunition,
bringing in a total of 2,566 weapons and 8,262 rounds of ammunition for both phases combined.
Arguably, the town of San Rafael, where 809 revolvers, pistols, shotguns and rifles were turned in
over the course of four days, in the southern section of Mendoza province, saw more weapons turned
in per capita than any other programme in the world to date.
Primary data for this paper was collected by the author and colleague Jacqueline Sullivan from the
Monterey Institute of International Studies in December 2000, March 2001 and June 2001.
Introduction: Background on Arms, Security and Violence in Argentina
The Argentine Small Arms Industry
Small Arms Survey (2001, p.16) classifies Argentina as a small producer in its ranking of international
manufacturers of small arms and light weapons and the third most important player in the Americas
behind the United States and Brazil. The definition of small arms and light weapons used in this paper
covers both military-style weapons and commercial firearms (handguns and long guns) (United
Nations, 1997). The terms small arms, weapons, firearms and guns will be used interchangeably
depending on the specific context.
2Argentina has been producing small arms since the 1930s. The arms industry grew exponentially after
1946 when the country began to pursue a policy of industrialisation through import substitution (Der
Ghougassian, 2000). More than twenty private sector firms existed, in addition to the multiple
production facilities of the state-owned Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), at the
height of the industry’s prosperity in the 1980s (Dreyfus, 2000a; Solingen, 1998). Historically, DGFM
has produced a variety of military weapons under license for FN Herstal (Belgium) and Beretta
(Italy), primarily for the Argentine military. In the late 1990s control of DGFM was transferred from
the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Finance and several factories were closed while others
merged with private sector interests. These changes took place in the context of greater competition
from Brazilian manufacturers; fall-out from DGFM’s illicit arms sales to Croatia and Ecuador in a
scandal that eventually brought the conviction and imprisonment of former Argentine president Carlos
Menem; and a larger governmental policy of privatisation of public enterprises under pressure from
international financial institutions (Dreyfus, 2000a).
Three important private producers still in existence are Bersa, Rexio and Mahely. All three operate
out of Buenos Aires province and produce a range of products for civilian and military markets, both
domestic and international. The private sector produced as many as 300,000 units per annum in the
1980s, but since 1994 the industry has only reached an average of 24,000 units per year (Small Arms
Survey, 2001, p. 28; Dreyfus 2000a). Table 1 shows Argentina’s firearms exports and imports since
1994. The country has maintained a positive firearms trade balance for the time period shown.
Table 1: Argentina – Firearms Imports and Exports (quantity)
Year Imports Exports
1994 43,341 49,792
1995 22,055 39,839
1996 29,529 51,318
1997 40,489 58,066
1998 45,864 44,206
1999 28,137 56,664
2000 33,828 44,070
Total 243,243 343,955
Source: Registro Nacional De Armas de Argentina, June 2001
Table 2 lists approximate dealer and black market prices for selected firearms in Argentina in addition
to Brazilian black market prices. Brazil’s large and relatively cheap black market trade provides ample
incentive to export guns to neighbouring countries such as Argentina.
3Table 2: Pricing Characteristics of the Argentine Firearms Market
Calibre Private Dealer Black Market Brazilian Black Market
.22 $200-900 $70-300 $30
.38 $250-900 $80-300 $40
9 mm $500-1,000 $150-400 $90
Source: Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad, Gobierno de Mendoza, November 2000
Role of Arms in Argentine Society
Despite Argentina’s violent past characterised by fifty years of military coups that lasted until the
beginning of the democratisation process in 1983, only during the last ten years have the country’s
citizens begun to show concern regarding the proliferation of firearms as it relates to public security
and crime (Der Ghougassian, 2000). The focus of security institutions shifted away from traditional a
focus on national defence and internal repression to new threats such as arms trafficking, police
corruption and international terrorism. The latter threat directly manifested itself in Argentina during
the two terrorist bombings against the Israeli embassy (1992) and a national Jewish organisation
(1994).
The years of military dictatorship did not bring about civil war as was the case in many Latin
American countries. The military always maintained strong restrictions on and control over military
weapons that could be used in a national uprising, though these restrictions did not impede guerrilla
forces from obtaining them during the period of forced disappearances of real and perceived enemies
of the military junta known as the ‘Dirty War’ (Der Ghoussian, 1998). Before democratisation took
root, the military junta used the fight against communism as a pretext for any forceful action taken
against the regime’s political opponents. Until former US president Ronald Reagan was able to
reverse his predecessor’s, (Jimmy Carter), limitations on arms sales to Latin America, Argentina and
Israel served as the main source for training of indigenous intelligence and combat units in Central
America’s Cold War conflicts as well as arm sales (Armony, 1997, p. 132). This role put more money
in the Argentine military junta’s coffers and helped prolong its legitimacy despite internal opposition.
Today Argentina is considered to be one of many links in the international illicit arms trade, especially
where its border meets both Brazil and Paraguay. Paraguay is renowned for its illegal arms bazaars
and links to Chinese organised crime rings, Brazilian drug trafficking gangs and ethnic Lebanese
criminal organisations (Drefyus, 2000b).
On the surface there appears to be a disconnect between the arms industry and the prevalence of
their use in acts of violence in present day Argentina. However, the new security threats of police
4corruption, drug trafficking and street crime have been exacerbated by a prolonged economic
recession resulting in high levels of unemployment. In their study of crime and violence in Latin
America, Buvinic, Morrision, et al. (1999, p. 27-28) concluded that in Argentina social violence
increased when income disparity grew. Shocking acts of violent crime involving firearms and its
reporting in the national press have increased dramatically in Argentina in recent years. According to
opinion polls public security is one of the top three unsatisfied needs of the country’s citizens (Der
Ghougassian, 2000, p. 9).
Firearms Statistics
There are 890 firearms vendors legally registered with the Argentine defence ministry’s National
Arms Register (RENAR). Of these 310 are found in Buenos Aires province, also home to the nation’s
capital. Twenty-two are located in the province of Mendoza serving a population of approximately 1.5
million. In Argentina there are 2,224,779 firearms registered with RENAR. The provincial register
held by the Ministry of Justice and Security (MJS) in Mendoza has 80,000 registered weapons and
officials estimate the number of illegally owned guns in the province to be near 15,000 (Zentil, 2000a).
Mendoza accounts for 4 per cent of Argentina’s population, but only 1.4 per cent of all registered
firearms. RENAR estimates that there are a total of 1 million illegal firearms circulating in Argentina.
More than 46,000 were reported stolen nationwide between January 2000 and March 2001 (RENAR,
2001).
75% of all legally registered weapons, at the national level and for Mendoza province, are pistols and
revolvers; 60% belonging to private citizens, 25% to public security authorities and the rest categorised
as collectibles (Appiolaza, 2000). Only 4% of all licensed firearms users are women (RENAR, 2001).
Argentine law permits civilian possession of revolvers up to .32 calibre, pistols up to 6.25 mm and
carbines up to .22 calibre. Special permits are required for .38 calibre revolvers and 9 mm pistols.
The Human Costs of Firearm Violence in Mendoza, Argentina
Mendoza, Argentina is not a hotbed of firearm violence in comparison with other South American
cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Brazil or Bogotá, Colombia. The use of assault rifles, grenades and other
military weapons in crime is not common as is the case in Central America and other parts of South
America. However, Argentina in general has experienced an exponential increase in the magnitude of
armed violence during the latter half of the 1990s. The context of Mendoza, and Argentina in general
for that matter, is not that of post-conflict countries rather more similar to the situation of the
industrialised nations focusing on crime prevention and community security enhancement. The typical
profile of a victim of gun violence is a young male between the ages of 15 and 30. However, there is
no profile for the typical person who is intimidated or threatened by firearms, but not physically
harmed. Tracking statistics for firearm related crime between 1998-2000 shows differing trends, on
5the one hand demonstrating a decrease in firearm homicides, and on the other, an increase in armed
robberies as illustrated below in Table 3.
Table 3: Firearm Related Crime in Mendoza, Argentina (1998-2000)
Year 1998 1999 2000(a)
Homicides 168 115 76
Armed robberies 2,474 3,538 3,458
Source: Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad, Gobierno de Mendoza, November 2000
(a) Figures for 2000 only include January through September.
As is often the case, criminal statistics differ from public health records because of approaches to data
collection and they are not directly comparable. According to the Ministry of Health and Social
Development, between 1997 and 1998 the total number of victims of gun violence, including suicides,
treated in Mendoza’s hospitals increased from 145 to 206, though the numbers of deaths decreased
(Appiolaza, 2000). Conversely, firearms deaths, where the victim did not make it to the hospital for
treatment, rose from 66 to 117 between 1998 and 1999. These figures have increased for both men
and women, though female victimisation levels are significantly lower. Tables 4 and 5 detail the
circumstances of death, with more specific information collected in 1999. At face value the more
detailed 1999 data that also include suicide data would indicate that rifles or shotguns are attributable
to more violent deaths than pistols and revolvers though the even greater numbers of deaths where the
type of firearm was not identified make it irresponsible to draw such a conclusion. The data also
indicates a marked increase in firearm deaths including suicide from one year to the next directly
contradicting the information presented by police sources in Table 3 above.
6Table 4: Firearm Deaths in Mendoza, Argentina (1998)
Type of Weapon Men Women Total
Pistol or revolver 12 2 14
Rifle or shotgun 6 1 7
Unidentified 39 6 45
Total 57 9 66
Source: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Salud, Gobierno de Mendoza, November 2000.
Table 5: Firearm Deaths in Mendoza, Argentina (1999)
Weapon/Situation Men Women Total
Suicide w/pistol or
revolver
5 1 6
Suicide w/rifle or
shotgun
17 3 20
Suicide
w/unidentified
weapon
25 1 26
Homicide w/pistol
or revolver
1 0 1
Homicide w/rifle or
shotgun
6 1 7
Homicide
w/unidentified
weapon
50 7 57
Total 104 13 117
Source: Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Salud, Gobierno de Mendoza, November 2000.
Even in the rich, industrialised countries such data held by different government agencies with
different mandates and agendas can be confusing and demonstrate conflicting trends. In Mendoza, in
general, it appears that the feeling of insecurity is on the rise, while confidence and trust of local
authorities is improving slightly. Recently, 46% of Mendoza’s population gave a positive evaluation
when surveyed on the local government’s performance in public security (Zentil, 2000b). This does
show that the majority still disapprove of their work, but is likely better than the attitudes toward the
now defunct police forces of prior decades that were inspired by a national security doctrine that
focused on the repression of subversive political activities rather than crime prevention, in order to
justify the continued military control of the government.
7Beginning in 1998, the provincial government of Mendoza and the distinct political parties with
representation in the provincial parliament initiated the reform of the police, including the creation of a
multidisciplinary public security training academy and university institute that also introduced many of
the more modern and socially-oriented law enforcement techniques such as community-oriented
policing (Appiolaza, 2000). Two hundred corrupt police officers were removed from the force at the
beginning of this process. Now, in order to reach important positions in the police ranks an officer has
to attend university and complete five courses in law. Decentralisation also took place within this
framework. Each of the province’s four zones have their own autonomous police force where there
once was one. Additionally there is a traffic police and investigations police, six police institutions in
total operating in the province.
As in almost all cases of security sector reform, the degree of institutional sincerity to carry forward
these changes in orientation and practice is debatable and we will not discuss that aspect here. The
judiciary has also undergone similar processes, though Mendoza continues to lag behind the other
regions of Argentina in relation to the crimes committed and sentences carried out, as demonstrated in
Table 6.
Table 6: National Comparison of Crimes and Sentences (1999)
Place Crimes Sentences Percentage
Province of Santa Fe 73,968 1.684 2.28%
City of Buenos Aires 191,755 2,513 1.31%
Province of Cordoba 104,362 1,207 1.16%
Province of Buenos
Aires
293,802 3,408 1.16%
Province of Mendoza 89,930 694 0.77%
Source: Ministerio de Justicia de Argentina, November 2000.
The situation in Mendoza thus far described demonstrates that firearms are present in this society and
do have measurable negative effects according to public security and public health statistics. While
policing techniques may be improving, it is evident that the judiciary must become more efficient in
prosecuting all crimes including those relating to firearms and violence. All of the discussion so far has
very much focused on statistical evidence provided by the national and provincial governments. We
must take this information for what it is worth, a reference point with which to begin to analyse the
problem. While no one is so naïve as to believe that government figures completely reflect reality, the
mere categorisation and stratification of data collected by government agencies tells us quite a bit.
8If we were only able to look at the situation in Mendoza through the lens of the information provided
above, it would be difficult to gauge the severity or nature of the problem. In relation to the nation’s
capital, crime appears to be less significant, with 6 out of each 100 Mendozans surveyed claiming to
have been victims of crime, in comparison to 15 in 100 for Buenos Aires. For that reason it would now
be appropriate to look at the human side of firearm violence in Mendoza through several anecdotal
examples provided below.
The following select cases that took place in different districts and municipalities within the province of
Mendoza during 2000 will help illustrate the nature of the problem:
· On 19 March Mr. Francisco Gabriel Agostino was shot and killed in his own house apparently by
his son in either a domestic argument or accident.
· On 3 April Ms Scarlett Muñoz was shot and injured while pushing her hot dog vending cart down
the street. She was caught in the crossfire from two rival youth gangs.
· On 12 September a toddler, Diego Matías López, lost his eye when he pulled the trigger of a gun
he found on the bed in a relative’s house where he was visiting.
· On 13 September twelve-year old Marisol Rosales was shot and killed when a stray bullet
penetrated her head while sitting in her house.
· On 19 September fifteen-year old Cintia Rodríguez was shot in the leg while visiting her neighbour
when yet another stray bullet from a gang fight came through the window.
Poaching and illegal hunting have also been uncovered as a source of the misuse and negative effects
of firearms on the environment. These incidents are more often associated with higher-powered
weaponry than those related to traditional domestic or street crime. In the first month of 2001 the
regional delegation of the forest service responsible for the region of Mendoza recovered sixteen
firearms including eight .22 calibre carbines, one Mauser carbine 7.62 mm, two shotguns of 12 and 16
gauge and three revolvers, calibres .22, .32 and .38 (Castón, 2001).
In short, there is concrete evidence that Mendoza is negatively affected by the presence and misuse
of firearms in several contexts in terms of crime and public health as well as the environment. With
9this much established it is now appropriate to discuss the particulars of the Ministry of Justice and
Security’s Arms Exchange Programme.
The Arms Exchange Programme for Better Living Conditions
Origins, Political Support and Planning
The idea of exchanging weapons for some in-kind benefit was not original to Mendoza. In fact these
types of programmes have been implemented in the United States for several decades now and in the
contexts of crime prevention and post-conflict peace building, for much of the 1990s. The Arms
Exchange programme in Mendoza was inspired by a study of prior programmes in El Salvador,
Panama, Rio de Janeiro, Albania and Cambodia among others. In fact the programme organisers
chose a strikingly similar name to that carried out by the municipal government of San Miguelito,
Panama in 1998.
Many in the United Kingdom will remember the gun buy-back scheme implemented by the Home
Office in collaboration with law enforcement in response to the 1996 school shooting in Dunblane,
Scotland, where sixteen children and a teacher were killed and twelve others were wounded. The
1997 Firearms Act prohibited civilian possession of all handguns. Between July 1997 and February
1998, 162,000 handguns and 700 metric tonnes of ammunitions were handed in throughout Great
Britain in exchange for amnesty and cash incentives. Despite several shortcomings, including the
failure to participate on the part of 25,000 gun owners, the programme was considered a marked
success collecting 87% of all legally registered handguns (Bonn International Center for Conversion,
2001)
A weapons exchange or amnesty programme was formally presented to the provincial legislature in
Mendoza, Argentina in February 2000. The first reactions were of hysterical laughter that then turned
into a heated debate on whether or not such a scheme would disarm criminals. Supporters from all
three major parties, Alianza, Justicialista and Demócrata, were more realistic and proposed that
such an effort would focus more on changing the culture and local attitudes in relation to the tools of
violence. As usual, the debate included the point of view that voluntary weapons collection would
leave the honest citizens defenceless against well-armed criminals. However, unlike many other
societies, the debate on the role of guns in society did not go strictly down party lines; the ruling
Alianza and Justicialista parties were unanimously for collecting weapons voluntarily, while the
Demócratas were divided even among siblings serving in the same legislature under the same party
flag.
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Even with broad political support in the province and the moral support of Argentine president
Fernando De La Rúa and the provincial leaders of Santa Fe and Cordoba, who were looking to see if
this programme was suitable for their regions, it took until 9 August 2000 to draft and approve the
Provincial Law on Disarmament #6809 (Appiolaza, 2000). This law did the following:
· Made it possible to turn in legal and illegal weapons, explosives and ammunition in exchange for an
in-kind benefit for the purpose of destruction for a period of 180 days with the possibility of
continuing on with the process for an additional 180 days.
· Created two toll-free telephone lines, one run by the MJS’s sub-secretariat for community
relations to provide information regarding the weapons turn-in programme and the other under the
control of the investigations police to denounce the presence and location of illegal weaponry.
· Established the framework to develop mechanisms that prevent the illegal entry of firearms,
explosives and ammunition into the provincial territory.
· Promoted the development of a strategy to better implement and control the regional register of
firearms and the commercial firearm trade.
Once this legal framework was established, the task of planning and implementing the weapons
collection scheme was placed in the hands of the MJS - specifically the sub-secretariat for community
relations under the authority of Mr. Gabriel Conte. Mr. Conte then in turn hired Martin Appiolaza, a
former journalist with Mendoza’s widest circulating newspaper, Diario Los Andes, to coordinate the
programme and educate the public about it. As a former journalist, one advantage Mr. Appiolaza had
was a distinct perspective from that held by police and politicians regarding public security and the role
of firearms in society. Not only did this help him conceptualise the challenge of motivating citizens to
hand in their guns from a more sociological perspective, but his contacts with the media ensured that
the programme would be covered by the newspapers during all of its stages. Correia (2000) notes that
the triangulation of support from local government, citizens and the media is critical for the success of
programmes designed to enhance community security. At this point the MJS and Appiolaza’s main
challenge was to convince the citizenry to embrace the programme and participate.
Before proceeding further, the programme organisers contacted dozens of NGO participants in the
emerging International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), including the high profile Brazilian
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disarmament movement known as Viva Rio.1 In addition to encouragement and moral support,
IANSA and Viva Rio put the MJS of Mendoza in contact with the Help Desk for Practical
Disarmament at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)2 from whom they received
expert advice and dialogued on different ideas and approaches. BICC had already developed a guide
to best practice in weapons collection and destruction with versions in English, Spanish, French,
Portuguese and Russian that was used as a key reference point for developing the overall programme
framework (Laurance, Godnick, et al., 2000). During the planning stages the Mendoza programme did
not only benefit from other experiences in the United States and Latin America, but also from the
‘Weapons for Development’ approach pioneered by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in Albania. While there may be competing opinions as to the effectiveness and efficiency of
the UNDP’s pilot weapons collection effort in Gramsh, Albania, the concept did bring out the idea of
promoting community participation in disarmament with the promise of the development of community
public goods and infrastructure. As we will see later the MJS in Mendoza decided to develop a hybrid
programme combining the individual material benefits of the “Goods for Guns’ approach with
collective community incentives.
Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of the Arms Exchange Programme must be seen in the context of the multi-
party political agreement that made its implementation possible. Under this agreement a new public
security policy was adopted including significant reforms of the police sector, increased investigation
and prosecution of organised crime networks and improved patrolling procedures in Greater Mendoza.
Additional focal points included expanded neighbourhood conflict resolution and mediation
programmes, community watch systems and forums to ensure direct citizen participation in security
sector policy.
The Arms Exchange Programme set out to communicate the message of disarmament to all levels of
society, provide advice and reinforce the many dangers that go along with firearm possession and
ownership.
                                                
1 For more information on the International Action Network on Small Arms visit <http//www.iansa.org> and for
Viva Rio visit <http://www.vivario.org.br>.
2 A wide range of resources and country/case profiles can be found on the BICC Help Desk website at
<http://www.disarmament.de>.
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The specific objectives of the programme were:
· Raise the price of firearms on the black market.
· Reduce the number of weapons available to criminals.
· Prevent further proliferation of firearms.
· Reduce the number of deaths, accidents and injuries.
· Reinforce the relationship between guns and violence.
· Increase community solidarity.
· Develop complementary programmes to benefit public security.
Public Education Campaign
Early on, programme organisers admitted that a voluntary weapons collection effort would not be
likely to bring in the guns in the hands of criminals and that the real goal was to influence a change in
culture and attitudes towards the role of guns in society. In that context the public education campaign
became equally as important as the proposed weapons turn-in programme. In order to get the word
out to the public and motivate them to participate in the Arms Exchange programme a multi-media
strategy was implemented by the MJS under the guidance of Martin Appiolaza, because of his
experience in the communications business. This public education campaign included:
· Establishment of a 1-800 toll-free number where people could get information on the Arms
Exchange programme;
· Constant coverage by the local newspapers;
· Television advertising that showed two identical guns side by side in front of a small child asking
him to distinguish the real from the toy;
· Creation of a website with all of the details of the programme3;
· Incorporation of non-governmental organisations, specifically neighbourhood groups and the
Football-Soccer League of Greater Mendoza, as extensionists at the community level; and
· Implementation of a violent toy turn-in campaign in the local elementary schools
                                                
3
 The Arms Exchange Programme website can be found at
<http://www.seguridad.mendoza.gov.ar/canje/canarm.htm>.
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The most powerful component of the MJS public education campaign was the violent toy exchange
campaign carried out in the local elementary schools. Violent toy turn-in drives are nothing new and
have been tried all over the world, especially in the United States. However, what made this
experience unique was how this experience connected directly to the upcoming weapons exchange
programme and the children were not only to be educated on the dangers of weapons, but were also
used as vehicles to influence their parents who might actually have firearms in the home.
Overall 6,000 school children turned in more than 6,000 violent toys and games in exchange for books,
potted plants and tree shrubs. Schools from nine departamentos (political divisions similar to counties)
in Mendoza province participated. Psychologists recommended against destroying the toys turned in
because that could be seen as a ‘violent act’, instead, the plastics were melted down and incorporated
into mosaicos or works of art to be displayed at school. In many schools, dramas were acted out,
choruses sung and balloons were launched into the sky with anti-violence messages. At one point, in
one particular school, all of the excitement riled up a group of school boys almost to the point of a
shoving match because each little boy claimed to support one football team against another, Boca
Juniors versus River Plate. When the school director noticed this he made both groups stand face-to-
face, shake hands and then hug. This might sound trivial, even ridiculous, but those who know the
seriousness with which Argentine fans support their football teams would see some significance in this
act, however short-lived its impact may be.
In short the violent toy turn-in campaign reached a sizeable public that included 6,000 children, their
teachers, parents and families. It may all sound like a trivial, feel good exercise, but several
participants in the actual weapons turn-in programme that began a month later mentioned the influence
of their children on their decision to turn in a gun.
Programme Implementation
Phase 1 – December 2000
Even before the programme began on 23 December 2000 several dozen people had called the toll-free
hotline to inquire about the weapons they wanted to hand in and the incentives available for doing so.
In essence, the MJS had made arrangements to receive 35 firearms via ‘home pick-up’. The rest of
the 285 firearms were turned in to pre-determined collection sites established throughout the Greater
Mendoza area in community halls, MJS branch offices and at the football-soccer league headquarters.
The weapons collected included revolvers up to .32 calibre, pistols up to .25 calibre, rifles and shotguns
up to .38 calibre with barrels no more than 60 cm in length. One thousand seven hundred and fifteen
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bullets were collected with the firearms, but were only taken as donations. This first stage of the
programme only included weapons permitted for civilian use. The MJS and both chambers of the
legislature committed themselves to work toward a temporary law in the near future that will permit
the turn-in of all types of illegal weapons in future rounds of collection.
Table 7: Weapons accepted under the Arms Exchange Programme
· Rifles, up to .22 calibre
· Shotguns, single barrel up to 60 cm
· Pistols, up to .25 calibre
· Revolvers, up to .32 calibre
· Any models manufactured prior to 1970
The actual collection effort lasted four days, 23-27 December 2000, and 285 firearms were
surrendered for destruction in exchange for tickets to sporting events or Vale Más vouchers for
values between $50 and $100. Vale Más are government subsidies similar to food stamps. They are
redeemable in ‘mom and pop’ small businesses, but not in the large chain supermarkets. This way the
provincial government helps promote the small businesses that are a dying breed with the global
expansion of large international hypermarket chains. In future rounds of collection the MJS is studying
installing community alarms in neighbourhoods that collectively turn in significant quantities of
weapons. The community alarms are electrical systems that connect houses in a given neighbourhood
and allow citizens to respond collectively to problems of crime and violence. Other incentives under
consideration for future efforts include educational scholarships; public transportation passes and
travel vouchers. Nineteen thousand, nine hundred dollars were spent in incentives to recover the 285
weapons turned in, resulting in an incentive cost of US$ 70 per weapon in the first phase of the
programme.
In addition to the MJS and police, other governmental and non-governmental agencies collaborated
with time and resources to make the Arms Exchange Programme possible, including the Ministry of
Health and Social Development and the Provincial School Board. At each site, including the mobile
collection sites, a team received the weapons and assisted the individuals participating on how to
choose the most appropriate form of compensation. A representative of the MJS sub-secretariat for
community relations and social workers from the same ministry greeted the programme participants.
A representative of the regional arms register RENAR assisted with all of the technical
considerations, out of uniform, so as not to cause distrust among people suspicious of police or military
official participation. The police only became directly involved in transporting weapons in plastic and
metal bins collected via house to house visits and guarding the weapons collected at the pre-
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established collection sites. Overall, the first round of the Arms Exchange Programme was deemed a
success, not only in terms of public awareness raising, but it also exceeded expectation for weapons
collected. Programme organisers were not expecting to receive more than 30 weapons total and in
fact collected 285, with much more interest in participation being expressed by groups and individuals
outside of the greater metropolitan area.
Because the nature of exchange was anonymous, and on a no questions asked basis, it was impossible
to collect data on the individuals who surrendered weapons. However, as has been the case in other
programmes ‘each weapon is a conversation’ and, in fact, many people choose to share their reasons
for turning in a weapon. Provided below are several anecdotal examples from Phase 1:
· In one community a woman in her forties turned in a revolver and refused any compensation. A
week earlier she had tried to kill her children and commit suicide.
· An old man called the toll-free number from a pay phone and the mobile collection unit went out to
meet him in the shack he lived in on the outskirts of town. He was unemployed and said the food
voucher he received for his gun would feed him and his wife for several months. Two more men
came out of their houses to turn in guns wrapped in newspaper when they saw their neighbour
turn his in.
· Another woman turned in a gun that was hidden in her house by her son who had been running
around with a local gang.
· Antonio R. had threatened his wife, Susana D, both university professors, with a revolver on
several occasions during domestic arguments. Susana insisted he turn in his gun as part of the
programme if he wanted them to stay together. He did!
· The owner of a small store in the conflictive Godoy Cruz neighbourhood turned in his revolver and
shotgun because he did not want to worry about someone being injured with his guns. He hoped
his example would motivate other people nearby to do the same.
· A middle-age couple turned in several guns for tickets to see their favourite football team play;
they had stored them away for many years without any intention of using them.
All of the guns turned in were crushed in a press publicly and stored in plastic tanks in the provincial
police storehouse. A local company donated time and the equipment to destroy the weaponry. The
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destroyed arms will be incorporated into one or more works of art, as they will be turned over to the
local university art department. Local artist and head of the university art department Eliana Molinelli
stated that “it is possible to create learning and beauty out of the material that was originally designed
only to kill and injure (Revista Nueva, 2001).”
Phase 2 – April 2001
After weeks of media attention the second phase of the Arms Exchange Programme began on 10
April 2001. In addition to establishing a collection centre at the MJS’ Office of Community Relations
in Mendoza Table 8 lists the collection centres established throughout the province.
Table 8: Dates and Locations of Phase 2 Collection Centres
April 10-11 a the Junín Cultural Centre
April 12-13/May 9-10 at Palmira
April 16-17 at the Tunyán bus terminal
April 18/May 7-8,10 at the Luján de Cuyo Municipal Building
April 16-20/May 2-4, 7-11,14-15 at the MJS Office of Community Relations, Mendoza
April 19-20 at the Villa Nueva Community Centre
April 23-25/May 2-4 at the San Rafael Railroad Museum
April 24 at the Maipú Shopping Centre
April 25-26 at the Union of Foodservice Workers, San Martín
April 27 at La Consulta in San Carlos
May 14 –16 in General Alvear
May 16-17 in La Paz
May 18 at Eugenia Bustos in San Carlos
The centres were strategically chosen to be locales already familiar to most of the community and
completely disassociated with the police. The second phase brought in 2,281 firearms. The MJS spent
US$112,850 in incentives to collect 2,281 firearms resulting in an incentive cost per weapon of $49 for
the second phase and $52 per weapon overall for the first two phases of the programme.
While weapons manufactured all over the world were turned in the overwhelming majority of
weapons were produced in Argentine factories. As was mentioned earlier the town of San Rafael, a
provincial municipality with a population of approximately 80,000, turned in 809 guns in four days.
When programme organisers ran out of incentives after the two days originally scheduled they had to
re-programme another visit to San Rafael. Other areas where public demand required return visits
included the Greater Mendoza Metropolitan Area and Luján.
Provided below are several anecdotal examples from Phase 2:
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· A woman with two teenage sons turned in a shotgun that she inherited from her father. “My boys
are always asking for grandpa’s shotgun, wanting to see it, touch it, play with it – it is not a toy
and I am scared that something will happen. We are not the kind of family that hunts, or…I don’t
want my boys to think that guns are useful for anything but hurt.
· A woman turned in a revolver that her husband originally bought for personal protection. Three
months earlier she came dangerously close to pulling the trigger during a domestic argument. “I
realized how dangerous it was to have a gun in my home. I hid it in the house and told my husband
it was stolen from my car. This was before I heard about the Arms Exchange Programme – I
heard about the weapons exchange and decided to get rid of it once and for all. Now I am not so
scared”.
· One man stated, “ I decided to turn my gun in because I have children. I used to hunt, but I don’t
anymore. Really, the main reason is that I am afraid my kids will come into contact with a bullet.”
· “ I heard about the weapons collection on television, and brought these guns that belong to my
grandfather to turn in. I think it is a good way to raise awareness for everyone about the danger of
guns.” Twenty year-old Patricia de López from Mendoza City.
· A paralysed woman who was confined to a wheelchair arrived at the office of the Ministry of
Justice and Security of Mendoza with a fully loaded pistol. She handed over the pistol after
confiding that she had recently bought the gun with the intention of committing suicide.
The arms collected in the programme’s second phase were destroyed on 9 July 2001 in Mendoza in
solidarity and unison with Small Arms Destruction Day that took in New York, and other locales
simultaneously around the globe, at the beginning of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms in All Its Aspects4, with the sponsorship of the governments of Brazil, Mali, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The weapons were crushed with a press donated by the private
sector as they were in Phase 1.
Evaluating the Arms Exchange Programme
                                                
4 For more information on the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms in All Its Aspects
visit < http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/ >.
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The Arms Exchange Programme has recovered more than 2,000 guns in exchange for foodstuffs,
soccer tickets and other items. It has reduced the possibility of accidents and misuse in the homes of
those who participated. Combined with the educational campaign in the schools it has also highlighted
the relationship of guns and violence in the minds of thousands of youth and their families. In fact the
Arms Exchange Programme in Mendoza influenced the Government of Argentina’s position before
the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms in All Its Aspects making it more
progressive and providing a concrete example from the non-post-conflict developing world.
Additionally, it should be noted that six other Argentine provinces: San Juan, Neuquén, Cordoba,
Chubut, the capital and the province of Buenos Aires have all now adopted Mendoza’s progressive
new security model which contemplates the implementation of an incentivised gun amnesty
programme.
Mendoza and its provincial neighbour San Juan have established a bi-provincial security commission
that includes combating arms proliferation and misuse (Diario Los Andes, 2001). As it relates to
firearms the commission has committed itself to:
· Develop provincial border controls to prevent arms and drug trafficking.
· Establish permanent, flexible information exchange mechanisms among police and provincial
government institutions.
· Promote harmonisation in police and judicial reform.
The idea is to eventually expand the commission to include other provinces in western Argentina.
Counterparts in the Ministry of Justice and Security of the Government of San Juan stated that they
would not have been as keen to form the bi-provincial commission had they not witnessed the success
of the Arms Exchange Programme.
Perhaps the only weakness the author of this report has found in the programme’s development and
implementation is the exclusion of people holding high-powered military weapons and explosives from
participating. Of course, Mendoza is unlikely to have large quantities of AK-47 rifles and hand
grenades, but other weapons excluded from the programme included 9 mm automatic pistols and .38
calibre revolvers, basically any weapons prohibited from civilian possession. It is understood that this is
probably a consequence of the political and legislative agreements that made the Arms Exchange
Programme possible. The main point here is that it is counterproductive to turn away people willing to
turn in specific types of illegal weapons when removing them from circulation is one of the
programme’s primary goals. Programme organisers have committed themselves to rectifying this
programme if they obtain further funding and approval to implement a third phase of the effort.
19
Evaluating the Arms Exchange Programme’s results will be a challenge. According to Rosenfeld
(1996) there are three types of programme goals to be evaluated in relation to gun buy-back
programmes: immediate goals related to service delivery, intermediate goals such as public awareness
and the ultimate programme goals which are re-stated below:
· Raise the price of firearms on the black market.
· Reduce the number of weapons available to criminals.
· Prevent further proliferation of firearms.
· Reduce the number of deaths, accidents and injuries.
· Reinforce the relationship between guns and violence.
· Increase community solidarity.
· Develop complementary programmes to benefit public security.
Public awareness will have to be measured through a variety of opinion polls and focus group
meetings. A multi-disciplinary group including community organisations, police and public health
officials must study the other more complex long-term goals. After the hundreds of programmes
implemented in the United States there is no conclusive evidence as to whether or not these
programmes reduce firearms proliferation and misuse, but this may underestimate other policy
objectives (Laurance, 1996). Rosenfeld (1996) goes on to say that the popular appeal and social
significance of gun buy-back programmes is mostly normative and ideological, part of a system of soft
controls. Success is measured via strengthening community bonds, mobilising support for community
leadership and calling attention to other forms of social control capable of reducing gun violence
against traditional crime control methods. Romero, Wintemute, et al. (1998) in their study of a 1993
programme in Sacramento, California concluded that the potential benefits of a gun buy-back
programme are more easily measured at the household rather than at the community level.
Quantifying Tangible Results
Table 9: Weapons Surrendered to the Arms Exchange Programme
Type Phase 1 Phase II Total
Carbines 26 165 191
Shotguns 35 373 408
Pistols 40 307 347
Revolvers 184 1,436 1,620
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Total 285 2,281 2,566
Source: Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad, Gobierno de Mendoza, Argentina, July 2001.
Even though programme organisers avoided making lofty claims and predictions about what the Arms
Exchange Programme would do in terms of impact beyond cultural change and public awareness
raising, sceptics in government and civil society will ask if the effort produced any tangible benefits.
Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson (2001) have put out a practical set of guidelines and simple formulas for
evaluating programme impact in terms of recovery statistics, crime statistics, economic statistics,
financial cost and risk rating. With the data currently available it is possible to evaluate the recovery
statistics and the financial cost of the programme. Crime statistics and the effect on the black market
for firearms will have to be measured over time in order to detect any impact, while the risk rating of
specific weapons requires analysing the use of specific models of weapons and their frequency of use
in firearms fatalities and injuries in order to calculate the number of potential lives saved.
a. Recovery Statistics
The 2,281 weapons recovered represent approximately 2.5% of all illegal and legally registered
weapons circulating in Mendoza, estimated to be 95,000 (80,000 legally registered and 15,000 illegal
weapons). However, the 2,281 weapons recovered represent 15% of the illegal weapons the MJS
estimates to be circulating in the province a much more significant recovery percentage
b. Financial Cost
Above the average cost of incentives per weapon recovered was estimated at US$ 52. Nevertheless,
there were other costs involved including personnel salaries, security, telephone operators, publicity,
supplies and logistics. The Arms Exchange Programme expended US$ 299,107 in programme
incentives and operating costs resulting in a cost of US$ 116 per weapon recovered
Evaluation Pitfalls
There are two direct challenges for anyone attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of a given
weapons collection programme. First, because they are generally anonymous in nature there is no
stopping someone from outside the designated geographic area from turning in a weapon. Second, the
actual number of illegal weapons is largely unknown, despite educated estimates. Additionally, there
are a wide variety of other policies, aside from voluntary weapons collection programmes that also
have an impact on the proliferation and misuse of firearms. Di Chiaro III (1998) and Greene (2001)
believe there are a multitude of other measures required to curb the spread and abuse of firearms
including:
· Strengthening enforcement of existing laws;
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· Harmonising approaches with neighbouring cities, provinces and countries;
· Uniquely marking small arms and light weapons;
· Pursuing greater transparency in weapons production and trade;
· Restricting ammunition supplies;
· Building capacity in affected regions;
· Improving data collection and information sharing;
· Improving security and storage capacity among governmental entities including record-keeping
and loss reporting;
· Ensuring high standards and practice among private security companies and other non-
governmental bodies authorised to maintain and use weaponry;
· Adopting a clear and unambiguous legal basis for possession and use; and
· Suppressing and removing the tools of violence through raids and other operations.
Attempting to isolate the impact of a weapons collection programme, or any other of the above-
mentioned policies, on the circulation and use of firearms during a given period of time is a very
difficult task. Beyond these difficulties there are an even greater mix of social, political and economic
variables more directly related to the root causes of arms proliferation and misuse that need to be
taken into consideration as part of any programme evaluation.
Conclusion
Of course the critics were right. Few, if any, criminals turned their guns in. However, from the start
the MJS stated that the goals of the Arms Exchange Programme were more cultural than anything.
Although on one occasion a man came into the community centre where the weapons were being
collected, placed two revolvers on the table and said “ I do not want to commit another robbery and I
am turning in my guns.” Authorities later found out that the admitted criminal took the $100 in food
vouchers he received for the revolvers and donated them to a home for the handicapped that same
afternoon.
The Arms Exchange Programme has far surpassed the expectation of even its most idealistic
supporters, both in hard numbers and inspiring stories. When Mr. Conte and Mr. Appiolaza first began
to promote the idea from within the MJS’ Office for Community Relations they became a subject of
political cartoons that poked fun at what they considered to be a naïve and simplistic idea. The
newspapers have since changed their editorial line, celebrating their community’s innovation and ability
to set a new standard for public security in Argentina.
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The Arms Exchange Programme has once again demonstrated that by focusing on the tangible tools
of violence one can obtain the attention of large segments of the population, especially concerned
mothers and other women. Hopefully, as a government entity, the MJS will seize the opportunity to
strengthen links with community groups, non-governmental organisations and the local police and
develop a broader programme of action that not only seeks reduction in firearm mortality and injury,
but also looks to have an impact on Mendozans’ perceptions of insecurity in their daily lives.
The Future of the Arms Exchange Programme
By mid-2001 the severe financial and economic situation in Argentina once again reached crisis levels.
Government expenditures, including funding provided by the central government to provincial
governments for projects such as the Arms Exchange Programme, were cut back on a grand scale. A
third phase of the programme planned for August 2001 was cancelled. Enthusiasm to implement
similar programmes on the part of other Argentine provinces slowed without the possibility of national
funding for their efforts.
The organisers of the Arms Exchange Programme in Mendoza, however, have not given up hope nor
halted their efforts. In cooperation with members of local civil society representatives from the MJS
have created the non-profit, non-governmental organisation Fundación Espacios para el Progreso
Social (Social Progress Foundation). Among their aims is the continuation of the Arms Exchange
Programme at the micro level, organising weapons collection and destruction in individual
neighbourhoods, substituting the economic support from the government with that of the private sector
and churches. This time around the politicians, press and society at large are less sceptical about the
programme’s potential to produce positive results.
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